International law has long been shaped by power imbalances – historically favoring colonial and Western interests. But what happens when formerly colonized nations decide to rewrite the rules? Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) offer a lens to critique the old order and imagine something new. Today, initiatives like BRICS (the bloc of Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) and their New Development Bank (NDB) show TWAIL’s ideas moving from theory to reality. From the legacy of the Bandung Conference to the creation of the NDB, this post explores how the Global South is building alternatives in international law and finance, and what opportunities and challenges come with this experiment.

TWAIL’s Critique of International Law and Its Vision for Change

TWAIL is an intellectual movement born from the Global South’s frustration with international law’s colonial roots. TWAIL scholars argue that modern international law developed alongside empire, often justifying the subordination of non European peoples. For example, legal scholar Antony Anghie has shown how the discipline was driven by a “civilizing mission” spreading civilization but in reality validating imperial domination (Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, 2005). Likewise, Makau Mutua famously critiqued human rights law as portraying Africans and Asians as victims in need of Western saviors, highlighting the bias in supposedly universal norms(Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights, 2001). These critiques expose how, for centuries, international rules and institutions enabled exploitation rather than
equality.

Yet TWAIL is not only about critique – it’s also about change. TWAIL thinkers seek to reform and remake international law so that it empowers the formerly colonized world. Scholar B.S. Chimni even drafted a TWAIL “manifesto,” calling on Third World countries to unite in reshaping global legal norms.(Third World Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto, 2006 In essence, TWAIL aims to transform the tools and institutions of international law – from instruments of Western domination into instruments of Global South empowerment, agency, and freedom. This means creating space for new voices, new principles (like the right to development), and new institutions that reflect the values of sovereignty and equality. It’s a vision of international law that serves all nations, not just the powerful few.

Bandung: The Original South–South Vision

The spirit of TWAIL draws on early moments of Global South solidarity—most notably the Bandung Conference of 1955, where 29 newly independent Asian and African nations gathered to assert their political autonomy and reject colonial and Cold War domination. Bandung championed principles of sovereignty, non interference, and equality, and called for deeper economic and cultural cooperation among developing nations. More than a historical event, Bandung symbolizes the birth of South–South cooperation and a shared desire for a just international order—foundations that directly anticipate the values later embraced by TWAIL and initiatives like BRICS.

BRICS and the New Development Bank: South–South Cooperation in Action

Fast forward to the 21st century: the BRICS coalition emerges as a new champion
of Global South interests. BRICS started as an economic acronym, but by the late
2000s these five major emerging economies had formed a political bloc to
coordinate their influence. Frustrated by their limited voice in institutions like the
IMF and World Bank, BRICS countries decided to build their own. The boldest
result was the creation of the New Development Bank (NDB) in 2015, a concrete
step toward the kind of alternative institution TWAIL might envision.

The NDB was designed from the ground up as a different kind of development
bank. Unlike the World Bank (where voting power depends on how much money a
country puts in, giving the US and its allies a built-in advantage), the NDB’s
governance gives each founding member an equal say. No single country
dominates or holds veto power. This reflects a principle of equitable governance:
Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa each contributed an equal share of
the bank’s capital, so they each have equal voting rights.

At the same time, this model has been adapted with the expansion of membership
(BRICS+). While new members are able to join the bank and participate in its
governance, the NDB’s institutional design ensures that the founding BRICS
countries collectively retain a majority of voting power (at least 55%). This means
that although the bank is open and expanding, its core decision-making structure
remains anchored in the founding members. As a result, the NDB combines
elements of inclusivity with controlled governance, allowing broader participation
without fundamentally redistributing power.

Just as importantly, the NDB breaks from the notorious conditionality practices of
Western lenders. Loans from the IMF or World Bank often come with strings
attached – borrowers must implement specific economic policies, privatize
industries, or cut deficits as prescribed. Many developing nations see these
conditions as infringements on their sovereignty, or even as neo-colonial
interference in domestic affairs. The NDB, by contrast, promises “no political or
economic conditionalities” on its financing. The bank is demand-driven: member
countries set their own development priorities, and the NDB assesses projects on technical merit rather than ideological criteria. This policy embodies TWAIL’s
emphasis on respecting sovereignty and local autonomy. It harkens back to
Bandung’s principle of non-interference: development aid should not come at the
cost of political independence.

The NDB’s mandate itself also aligns with Global South needs. It focuses on
infrastructure and sustainable development projects in emerging economies –
things like roads, clean energy, transportation, and water management. These are
areas crucial for economic growth and improving living standards, which many
Southern countries feel were neglected or underfunded by the old Bretton Woods
institutions. By mobilizing resources for such projects without the usual strings
attached, the NDB offers an alternative path for development finance. It’s a
tangible example of South–South cooperation – countries pooling their funds to
help each other grow, rather than relying on aid from the North.

Sovereignty, Conditionality, and Equitable Governance at the NDB

In its structure and policies, the NDB reflects core TWAIL values:

∙ National Sovereignty: From its inception, the New Development Bank has
pledged to respect its members’ political autonomy. It does not dictate
reforms or meddle in how states run their affairs. This stance is a direct
response to decades of perceived infringements by Western-dominated
institutions. By letting countries lead their own development agendas, the
NDB affirms the sovereign equality that TWAIL advocates. This approach
is rooted in the idea that developing states know their own needs best, and
that external interference often echoes colonial patterns. The Bandung
principles of self-determination and non-interference are clearly at work
here, now applied to international lending.
∙ No Imposed Conditionalities: The NDB’s no-conditionality policy is perhaps
its clearest break from the old order. Loans come without the heavy handed
policy prescriptions (privatize this, cut that) that often accompanied IMF
programs. Instead, the bank focuses on “prudential” conditions – ensuring
that projects are financially sound and funds are used as intended – rather
than political conditions about how a country should govern. To TWAIL,
this lack of intrusive conditionality is crucial: it treats borrower nations as
partners, not subjects being lectured on how to behave. It’s a restoration of
dignity in international finance.
∙ Equitable Governance: The governance of the NDB is designed to be fair and
inclusive, echoing TWAIL’s call for reforming unequal power structures.
Each of the five founding countries holds an equal share in the bank’s
capital, preventing any one member from controlling decisions. There is no
U.S.-style veto power. The Presidency of the bank rotates among the
members, symbolizing that leadership is shared. This equal voting rights
model is a sharp contrast to the World Bank and IMF, where votes are weighted by how much capital a country provides (and where the U.S. and
Europe historically have the lion’s share of influence). Equitable governance
is not just a technical detail – it’s about representation and voice. For the first
time, major developing nations have created a financial institution where
they set the rules and agenda, reflecting their collective priorities. This
aligns with TWAIL’s long-standing demand to democratize international
institutions or create new ones that give the Global South a fair say.
In all three aspects -sovereignty, conditionality, governance – the NDB
operationalizes what TWAIL scholars have been calling for. It shows that critique
can be transformed into concrete alternatives.

Opportunities and Limits of the BRICS/NDB Model

The BRICS initiative and the NDB spark genuine hope for a more balanced
international order. There are several clear opportunities in this model of South
South cooperation. First, it provides developing countries with options. A nation in Africa, Asia, or Latin America seeking funds for a new highway or port can
approach the NDB and not be immediately subjected to a laundry list of external
reforms. This can lead to more ownership of development projects and policies. It
might also spur healthy competition – the World Bank and others could feel
pressure to soften their conditionality or be more inclusive, lest they become
irrelevant. Economic sovereignty is another potential benefit: BRICS have even
discussed trading in local currencies and reducing reliance on the US dollar. In the
long run, that could mitigate vulnerabilities to external shocks or political pressure (sanctions, for example). The NDB and a related BRICS arrangement, the
Contingent Reserve (a mutual financial safety net), together hint at a future where
the Global South isn’t entirely dependent on Washington or Brussels in a crisis.

These initiatives embody a multipolar ethos -the idea that international law and
finance need not be one-size-fits-all or dominated by a few wealthy states.
That said, it’s crucial to recognize the limits and challenges of the BRICS/NDB
model. For one, the NDB is still a relatively small player in financial terms. Its
authorized capital of $100 billion and a portfolio of dozens of projects is
significant, but it pales next to the trillions deployed by the World Bank or global
markets over decades. The NDB alone cannot resolve the vast infrastructure and
development needs of the Third World. It’s a start -a proof of concept -but not a
full replacement for existing institutions.

Another challenge lies in the diversity of BRICS themselves. Brazil, Russia, India,
China, and South Africa have very different economies and sometimes conflicting
geopolitical interests. Achieving consensus can be slow and complicated. For
instance, China’s economy is larger than all the others combined, which inevitably
raises questions about whether the NDB will truly operate as an equal partnership
or tilt toward Beijing’s priorities. (Critics have worried about potential “China dominance” behind the scenes, although the one-country-one-vote design aims to prevent that.) Similarly, internal political differences – democratic and authoritarian members, rivalries like India-China tensions can strain unity. These internal dynamics mean BRICS may not always present a cohesive front, potentially limiting how bold or effective their joint initiatives can be.
The no-conditionality approach, while popular with borrowers, has its own pitfalls to navigate. Without enforced standards on issues like governance or environmental impact, there’s a risk that some NDB-funded projects could fall prey to local corruption, mismanagement, or cause social harm. The bank has to
walk a fine line: it must ensure loans are used responsibly (through safeguards and oversight) without sliding into the heavy-handed paternalism it was created to avoid. Finding that balance is key to the NDB’s credibility. Civil society observers note that the NDB should uphold high standards (on transparency, environmental protection, human rights) voluntarily, or else it could face the same criticisms once leveled at Western lenders. In short, being principled should not mean being lax.

Conclusion

In a balanced view, the BRICS and NDB model is both an opportunity and a test.
It’s an opportunity to put into practice values that have long been advocated from
the periphery – equality, justice, and respect in international cooperation. And it’s a test of whether solidarity can endure when translated from conference speeches and academic articles into hard institutions dealing with real money and politics.

For students of international law (and especially those rooting for TWAIL
perspectives), the BRICS initiative is a fascinating chapter unfolding in real time. It invites us to stay critical yet hopeful: to appreciate the constructive steps taken
toward a fairer system, and to critically watch how these new institutions evolve.
In the end, the “Global South for the Global South” approach of BRICS resonates
deeply with TWAIL’s ethos. It may not transform the world overnight, but it signals a gradual shift towards a more inclusive multipolar order.